international trade case study and need a sample draft to help me learn.
Listen to this interview https://www.npr.org/2021/03/24/980784956/uppababy-…, and complete Reflection as follows.
There will be 4 paragraphs, two on page 1 and two on page 2.
In each para on page 1, identify an observation made by the entrepreneur in the podcast and relate it to a Global Business Strategy. Timestamp is the time at which the entrepreneur makes that observation (mm:ss). You should first identifying the entrepreneur’s observations, interpreting the results, and connecting them to the strategies in the class readings.
In each para on page 2, pick up a strategy from the class readings and tie it to entrepreneur’s success/failure in the podcast.
None of the strategy concepts should overlap with each other. Make sure to refer the reading from which you are picking the strategy.
Your submission should be in Arial 11 point font, 1.5 spaced-lines, 1 inch margins on all four sides.
These files are class reading, just choose one. If you need more reading, please text me.
Requirements: 2 pages
MIT CENTERFORTRANSPORTATION &LOGISTICSWinninginEmergingMarkets:FiveKeySupplyChainCapabilitiesbyDr.EdgarBlancohttp://ctl.mit.edu/researchAResearchPaperfromtheCenterforTransportation&Logistics
HTTP://CTL.MIT.EDU/RESEARCHWithover80percentoftheworld’spopulationlivinginnon-developedcountries,thereisawealthofopportunitiesforcompaniesthatareabletoprofitablyservethesecustomers.Somehavealreadymadesignificantinroads.Forexample,Nokia’ssalesinChina,HongKongandTaiwanjumped28percentin2005,makingtheregionitsbiggestmarket.IndiaisexpectedtosurpasstheUSasNokia’ssecondlargestmarketby2010.Developingmarketscurrentlyrepresent35percentofsalesforUnilever.GEexpectsthat60percentofitsgrowthwillcomefromthesecountriesinthenextdecade,comparedto20percentforthepast10years.P&Gdevotesabout30percentofits$1.9billionannualR&Dspendtolowincomemarkets.2SUPPLYCHAINTYPICALEMERGINGPERFORMANCEPERFORMANCEMARKETOBJECTIVES1METRICSCHALLENGESCustomerResponseOrdercycletimesPoorinventoryvisibilityPerfectorderfulfillmentPoorinfrastructureQualityCongestionNewproducttimetomarketLackofdemanddataPredictabilityofdemandCulturaldiversityAssetUtilizationFacilityUtilizationPoliticalinstabilityInventoryTurnsVolatilemacroeconomicsCash-to-CashCycleComplextaxationsystemsPoorinventoryvisibilityPoorfacilityqualityLow-incomepopulationEfficiencyLaborProductivityFluctuatingregulationsOptimumproducttouchesBureaucracyLeanoperationsCorruptionProcurementeffectivenessPoorinfrastructureFreightcostsLongdistancesLowpopulationdensityFragmentedmarketsFIGURE1–EMERGINGMARKETCHALLENGESINSUPPLYCHAINPERFORMANCEWinninginEmergingMarkets:FiveKeySupplyChainCapabilitiesbyDr.EdgarBlancoDirector–CTLEmergingMarketsResearchInitiativeABSTRACT:Theauthormakesthecasethatthereare5keysupplychaincapabilitiesthatarenecessaryinorderforcompaniestoprofitablyserveemergingmarkets.Thesecapabilitiesinclude:1)high-resolutioncustomersegmentation2)holisticproductdesign3)tailoredsupplystrategies4)complexdistributionmanagement,and5)anentrepreneurially-drivenorganization.Blancofurtherstatesthatsupplychainsforemergingmarketsneedtobebothcheapandofhighquality,andthatadvancesmadeinemergingmarkets’supplychainscanoftencarryoverprofitablytoacompany’ssupplychainsindevelopedmarkets.
Still,globalcompaniesneedtoovercomeacomplexsetofchallengesastheypenetratethesemarkets.Thesechallengesarenewlydocumentedandrangefromanunstablepoliticalandeconomicenvironmentandpoorinfrastructuretolowerpricepointexpectations(sincetheseregionsrepresentlessthan20percentoftheworldGDP).Allthesefactorshaveadirectimpactonthedesignandexecutionofsupplychains.Figure1summarizestherelationshipbetweenthetraditionalsupplychainperformanceobjectivesandthedistinctchallengesfacedinemergingmarkets.Thesemarketchallengesnecessitatechangesinsupplychainsbeyondadaptingtheexistingstrategiesusedindevelopedcountries.Wehaveidentifiedfivekeysupplychaincapabilitiesthatcompaniesneedtodevelopeinordertosucceedinemergingmarkets:high-resolutionsegmentation,holisticproductdesign,tailoredsupplystrategies,complexdistributionmanagement,andanentrepreneurially-drivenorganization.Developingthesecapabilitieswillhelpsupplychainorganizationstosuccessfullytackletheseemergingmarketchallenges.EmergingMarketsDefinedThereisnoconsensusonthedefinitionofemergingmarketsorthecountrieswithemergingeconomies.Inlooseterms,anemergingmarketisdefinedasaneconomywithlow-to-middlepercapitaincomethatisintransitiontoamoredevelopedeconomy,characterizedbystableandsustainedeconomicgrowthandhighstandardsofliving.Figure2showsthecountriescommonlyconsideredasemergingeconomies.FIGURE2–DEVELOPED(PINK)ANDEMERGING(GREEN)MARKETSThemapillustratesthewidevarietyofcountriesunderthislabel.Brazil,Russia,India,andChina(BRIC)andsometimesHongKongandSingapore,aresingledoutbecauseoftheirincreasedgrowthrateandsignificantpopulationshare.ButthelistincludesthemajorityofthecountriesinSouthAmerica,MexicoandahandfulofAfricanandEastEuropeancountries,amongothers.CapabilityNo.1:HighResolutionSegmentationThecorrectcustomerandmarketsegmentationallowsthedesignofsupplychainsthatareproperlyalignedwithcustomerneeds.Emergingmarketsnotonlycoverawidevarietyofcountries,butthinkingofacountryorgeographicalregionasasinglesegmentmayalsobeamisconception.First,thereisahugedifferencebetweenruralandurbanareas.Urbanareastendtohavemuchhigherlevelsofinfrastructure,whichfacilitatelogisticsoperations,butsufferfromhighcongestionandpollutionlevels.Eightofthetop10biggestcitiesintheworldareinemergingmarkets,butwithinthesecitiesyouwillfindalargedisparityfrompoorslumstoaffluenthighrises.Andeachcountryhasdifferenturbanprofiles.Forinstance,inMexico,SouthKorea,andColombiamorethan70percentofthepopulationliveinurbanareas,comparedtofewerthan30percentinIndia.Second,customerexpectationsmaybetiedmoretoculturethannationalboundaries.Forexample,coastalcitiesondifferentCaribbeanislandssometimessharemoresimilaritiesthancitieswithinthesameislandcountry.Third,customersinemergingmarketsmayhavethesameneedsandsupplychainexpectationsascustomersinthedevelopedworld.ConsidertheIndianITindustry.Eventhoughit’slocatedinsideanemergingeconomy,itservesbusinessesacrossNorthAmericaandEuropethatexpecthighserviceandreliability.Therefore,atechnologysupplychaininIndia,suchasCisco’s,istailoredtoveryexperiencedusersthatexpectservicelevelscomparabletothoseofitsothercustomersinthedevelopedworld.Customerandmarketsegmentationhavealwaysbeencentralconsiderationsformarketingprofessionals.Whenreachingintoemergingmarkets,understandingthecustomerdiversityandtranslatingittoaneffectivesegmentationschemewillbecriticaltodesigningefficientsupplychainoperations.CapabilityNo.2:HolisticProductDesignServingalower-incomeregionrequiresmanagingproductaffordability.Forexample,Motorolahasdevelopedandcommercializedanultra-lowcost(lessthanUS$30)handsetundertheEmergingMarketHandsetProgramrunbytheGSMAssociation.TheOneLaptopperChildinitiativeisdevelopingaUS$100laptop.P&GwasabletogrowitsstagnantdiapersalesinBrazilbyintroducingalesssophisticated,unisexdiaperthatHTTP://CTL.MIT.EDU/RESEARCH3
HTTP://CTL.MIT.EDU/RESEARCHsoldforhalfthepriceoftheproductadaptedfromtheirdevelopedmarkets.Butproductredesignforemergingmarketsgoesbeyondfindingwaystocutcosts.Understandingtheuniqueneedsandexpectationsoftheconsumerscouldrevealhiddenmarketopportunities.Forexample,NokiadevelopedhandsetmodelsspecifictoIndiawithtailoredfeaturessuchasaflashlight,adust-cover,andaslip-freegrip.ForChineseruralcustomers,NokiadevelopedphonesthatprovidedChinesecharacterswrittenwithastylusasopposedtoitsotherproducts,whichusedaless-familiarRomancharacterbasedsystem.Giventheseuniquemarketconditions,theearlyconsiderationofmanufacturing,sourcing,anddistributionduringtheproductdesignphaseisevenmorecrucialinemergingmarkets.Innovationsinproductandpackagingtosustainharsher(andlonger)distributionnetworks,orinmanufacturingprocessesthatareabletoleveragelocalsuppliers,canallowcompaniestoachieveasustainablecompetitiveadvantage.ThroughitsexperiencewithanexperimentaldiaperfactoryinVietnam,P&Gwasabletocutthecostofsourcingdiapermanufacturingby30percent.ThisproductandprocessredesignallowedP&Gtoengagealow-costsuppliernetworkthatismoreaccessibleinemergingmarkets,asopposedtohigh-speedsophisticatedmanufacturingusedindevelopedmarkets.TheapproachwassosuccessfulthatP&GstartedtoswapoldNorthAmericandiaperlineswithinexpensiveonesfromAsia.IthasalsoallowedP&GtosellitsNaturellapadsinMexicofor20percentlessthanitsexistingproduct.Productpurchasesizesinemergingmarketsalsovarydramatically.Homesaresmaller,asareretailstores,offices,andtransportationvehicles;customerstendtobuysmallerquantitiesbecauseofincomeandspacelimitations.Packagingdesignshouldincorporatenotonlycustomerneedsbutalsothesupplychain’suniquecharacteristics.Thismeansproductdesignandinnovationcannolongerbecentralizedattheworldheadquarters;proximitytothemarketisneeded.Holisticproductinnovationthatintegratesaffordability,customerneedsandsupplychainwilldrivegrowthandprofitabilityinemergingmarkets.CapabilityNo.3:TailoredSupplyStrategiesInordertoreachlocalemergingmarkets,supplychainswilllikelytakevariationsofoneofthefollowingthreegeneralproductsupplystructures:1.Out-of-marketsupplyforentireproduct2.Localassemblywithout-of-marketsupplyforcomponentsorsubassemblies3.Localproductionandassembly4SUPPLYSTRATEGYDRIVERSADVANTAGESDISADVANTAGESOut-of-market»Capitalintensive»Minimalfacilityinvestment»Longercustomerleadtimes»Limitedlocaldemand»Minimalpoliticalrisk»Nolocalcapabilities»Minimalproduct»Exposuretoexchangeratescustomization»HighproductvaluedensityLocal-assemblywith»Capitalintensive»Buildslocalcapability»Exposuretoexchangeratesout-of-market»Productcustomization»Taxincentives»Increasedsuppliercomponents»Customerservice»Reducedleadtimescoordination»ModularityLocalproductionand»Laborintensive»Buildslocalcapability»Politicalriskassembly»Regionalsuppliers»Taxincentives»Majorcapitalinvestments»Regionalmarketexpansion»Highcustomerservice»Localtalent»Market-drivenproductdesignpotential»Localsupplierbase»Lowproductvaluedensity»HighgrowthpotentialFIGURE3–SUPPLYSTRATEGIESWITHSELECTEDDRIVERS,ADVANTAGES&DISADVANTAGES
Anout-of-marketsupplystrategyisthestartingpointformanycorporations.Itmayalsobetheonlyfeasiblealternativeforcapital-intensive,long-lead-timefacilitiesorwhendemandcannotoffsetthecostofalocalfacility.ThiswasthestartingmodelusedbyDellforLatinAmerica.Inalocal-assemblywithout-of-marketstrategy,someoftheproductcapital-intensivecomponentsareproducedoutofmarketandarethenassembledinthelocalmarket.Thisallowsforafasterlocalmarketreactionwhilebalancinginvestmentrisks.DellmigratedtothisstructureinBrazilin1999(HPin1997),whileatCoca-Colathishasbeenthebottlingmodelforamuchlongertime.Finally,inalocalproductionandassemblystructure,themajorityoftheproductionoperationstakeplaceinthelocalmarket.Thissupplymodelallowsmaximumresponsetimetothecustomer,butrequiressignificantlymorecapitalinvestmentandlocaltalent.ThisistheoperationalstructureusedbyNokiainIndiaandChina.Therearemanydrivers,advantages,anddisadvantagestoeachofthesesupplystrategies(seeFigure3).Corporationsusuallyhavestructuredprocessesthatsupportthesedecisions,butsuchprocessestendtofitstandardmodelsandtimehorizonsthataren’talwayssuitableforemergingmarkets.Supplychainorganizationsneedtoactivelyparticipateinthisprocessandincorporatespecificelementsoftheemergingmarketpotential,uniqueproductcharacteristicsandcustomerserviceexpectations.TheP&GdiaperexperienceinVietnamillustratessomeoftheadvantagesofconsideringstructuresthatmaynotfitthecorporation’straditionalsupplystrategy,butyieldsignificantadvantagesinthelongterm.CapabilityNo.4:ComplexDistributionManagementDistributionchannelsvarydramaticallyinemergingmarkets,requiringamoreflexibleandadaptabledistributionnetwork.Thesechannelsarenotsimplevariationsoftheirdevelopedcounterparts.Forexample,inmanylargecities,distributiontomuchofthepopulationisoftenthroughsmall,hole-in-the-wallshops(i.e.paanwallashopsinIndia,tiendasdelaesquinasinMexico,orsari-saristoresinthePhilippines).InBrazil,upto15percentofallapparelissolddoor-to-doorinpoorerneighborhoods.India’ssmallestvillages,atotalestimatedmarketof600million,usuallylackdistributionoradvertisingnetworks.Inordertoreachtheseconsumers,Unileverisprovidingtrainingandproductinformationtogroupsofwomenwhosellthecompany’sproductsinmuchsmallerpackagesdirectlyinthecommunity.ThelackofamoreextensivedistributionchannelinLatinAmericahasbeenachallengeforDell,givenitsdirectsalesbusinessmodel.Thishasresultedinamuchhighernumberofcorporateclients,bigandsmall—acompletelydifferentmixfromitsNorthAmericanoperations.Thesechallengesarecompoundedbytheextremelyfragmentedtransportationsectorandtheunreliablepostalservices.Inordertodealwiththecomplexityandlackoflocalknowledgeofdistributionnetworks,companiesusuallyresorttogeneraldistributors.Althoughthismaybethemostcost-effectivesolution,distributorsinemergingmarketsusuallyhavelimitedreach,tendtoconcentrateonfastestmovingproducts,andoftenuseunconventionalbusinesspractices(includingbriberyandtaxevasion).Butthemaindisadvantageofthesearrangementsisthattheexpertiseandlocalcontactswillremainwiththedistributor,whomayormaynotbealignedwiththeinterestsofthecorporation.Thismayjeopardizelongtermgrowthofthemarket.Alternativeapproachesincludeestablishingjointventureswithlocalpartners,developingproprietarydistributionnetworks,oracquiringexistingnetworks.Allofthesearesensibleapproaches.WhenB&QAsia,thebiggesthomeimprovementchaininChina,decidedtoopenitsfirststoreinShanghaiin1998,itdecidedtodosothroughajointventurewithalocalcompany.AlthoughitalreadyhadanoperationinTaiwan,whatworkedtheredidnotnecessarilyapplytotheShanghaioperation.Thispartnershipwasextremelyvaluableinsustainingitsfast-pacedgrowth.HomeDepot,ontheotherhand,acquiredHomeWayinlate2006inordertoopenitsfirststoresinChina,buthasbeensharingbestpracticeswiththeretailerfor10years.LenovobuiltitsdistributionnetworkinChinafromscratch.Itnowhas5,000storefrontsandistryingtoreplicatethesameapproachinIndia.Carrefour,theonlyforeigncompanyamongChina’stop10retailers,hasorganicallybuiltitsstorenetworkof73hypermarketsandsome250smallerformatstoressince1995.Theabilitytoadapttoavarietyofdistributionstrategieswillproveevenmorecrucialtostaycompetitiveandsustaingrowth.Inthelastfewyears,NokiahadtodecentralizeitsChinaoperationsandincreaseitssalesofficesfromthreeto70whileatthesametimemovingfromahandfulofnationaldistributorsto50provincialones.ManagingsuchcomplexHTTP://CTL.MIT.EDU/RESEARCH5
HTTP://CTL.MIT.EDU/RESEARCHdistributionenvironmentsrequiresknowledgemaintenanceandstrongrelationships.CapabilityNo.5:Entrepreneurial-DrivenOrganizationUnderstandingthelocalbusinessenvironmentandthelocalcultureareimportant.Havingtherightskillsinthesupplychainorganizationiscriticaltosuccess.Butinenvironmentswithdistinctcultures,complexbusinessrules,changingregulation,andvolatileeconomicenvironments,rapiddecision-makingisalsoneeded.Anentrepreneurialspiritneedstobefosteredwithintheorganization.Managersimplantedfromdevelopedcountriesmaynotbeaccustomedtoemergingmarketenvironments.Successfulsupplychainshaveworkedveryhardtoidentify,develop,andutilizelocaltalentinthecriticallevelsoftheorganization.Carrefour’sChinapresidentpersonallyselected25individualsalreadyfamiliarwiththeTaiwanoperationtodevelopthebusinessplanformainlandChina.HealsomakessurethatkeyoperationsaremanagedbyChinesenationalswithCarrefourtrainingandalong-termcommitmenttothecompany.Similarexperiencesareobservedinotherindustriesandinvariousfunctionsofthesupplychain.Competitionforlocaltalentisfierce.Creativetrainingandretentionprogramsensureanavailabilityofskillstosupportmarketpenetrationgrowth.Sinceemergingcountrieshavelargeemigrantpopulations,somecompaniesareabletofind“localtalent”indevelopedcountries.Tryingtoforceglobalpracticesintosupplychainsinemergingmarketsmaystifleinnovationandjeopardizetheoperation.Adequatetrainingandsupportneedtobegiventolocalorganizations,butglobalcomplianceexpectationsneedtobereassessedtoaccommodatelocalregulationsandcustoms.Forexample,inChinaandmanyareasofLatinAmerica,personalrelationshipsandverbalcontractsarecommonbusinesspracticesthatmaynotfitwellwithinacentralprocurementorganization.Establishedtechnologyandprocessesdisciplinearelackingskillsinmanyemergingcountries,butsupplychainorganizationsneedtoworkhardtomaintaintherightbalance.Asinmostsupplychainoperations,organizationaltalentiscentraltosuccess.Thisisnodifferentinemergingmarkets:infact,itisamplifiedbytheneedofadaptabilityandgrowth.World-Class,Dirt-CheapSupplyChainsNeededEmergingmarketsarecomplexenvironments.Developingthe6SUPPLYCHAINCAPABILITYKEYPOINTSHighResolutionSegmentationAvoidmonolithicviewsUnderstandruralvs.urbanCulturalAwarenessHolisticProductDesignLocalknowledgeValuedriven,costconsciousTailoredfunctionalityIncorporatesupplychainoperationalstructureearlyTailoredSupplyStrategiesConsiderlocalproductionand/orassemblyEvaluatetaxrisksInfluencetraditionalcorporatefinancialmodelsComplexDistributionManagementExpectcomplexchannelmanagementConsidercommunity-basedinitiativesWeighcarefullyvalueofdistributorsEntrepreneurial-DrivenOrganizationLocalentrepreneurshipLeveragecross-marketsimilaritiesFunnelknowledgeFIGURE4–CAPABILITIESFORDEVELOPINGSUCCESSFULSUPPLYCHAINSINEMERGINGMARKETS
rightsupplychainrequiresaverycost-conscious,locally-drivenorganizationthatcanstillleveragetheglobalstate-of-theartstrategiespioneeredindevelopedmarkets.Thefivekeycapabilitiesoutlinedbelowwillhelpcompaniesachievelong-termcompetitiveadvantage.Thereareothersupplychainelementsrelevanttoemergingmarketsthatareworthhighlightingandthatrequirefurtherresearch:»Roleofsuppliers.Iflocalsuppliersarenotavailable,isitbettertodevelopthemineachmarketorleverageexistingpartner-ships?Aninterestingparadoxisthatmanysuppliersfordevelopedmarketsarebasedinemergingmarkets;however,theirfacilitiesandproductsaretailoredforexportingandarenotalwayssuitableforlocalconsumption.»Supplychainevolution.Astheemergingmarketevolvestoamoredevelopedmarket(ortoanunderdevelopedone),thesupplychainneedstosupportthistransition.Thismayhavesignificanteffectsinrisk,resilience,andoverallsupplychainstrategicinvestments.»Theroleoftechnology.Thereissometimesanassumptionthatthetechnologyadoptionroadmapwillbeidenticalinallmarkets,butemergingmarketscanlearnfromestablishedmarketsandavoidinterimtechnologysteps.Thisisanoppor-tunityto“leapfrog”overtheestablishedmarkets.Wirelesscommunicationsareagoodexample.Becauseofthelackofcoverageofbasictelephonyservices,adoptionofwirelesstechnologyhasbeenmuchfasterthanindevelopedmarkets.Thissameprinciplemayapplytosupplychaintechnologies(e.g.,RFID).»Localcompetition.Whatwillbetheimpactoflocalcompeti-tiononsupplychaindesign?Althoughsomeoftheemergingmarketsmaybethefrontierforsomebigcorporations,estab-lishedlocalcompetitorshavebeenoperatingformanyyears.»Intellectualpropertyrisks.Innovationinemergingmarketsisthreatenedbyhigherrisksaroundintellectualproperty.IPprotectionlawsareusuallynonexistentorverylooselyenforced.Thishasbothcustomerserviceimplications(e.g.,liabilityandproductidentification)aswellaslongtermsupplychaincompetitivenesschallenges.»Brandprotectionandcannibalization.Asnewproductsareintroducedforemergingmarkets,somecannibalizationmayoccurbetweenthepremiumbrandsandthelowerpricepointalternatives.Thismaytranslateintosupplychainstrategiesdesignedtominimizecross-effectsorleverageproductsimilaritiesanddifferences(e.g.,distri-butionchannels,highercustomerexpectations,value-addedservices).HTTP://CTL.MIT.EDU/RESEARCH7Forfurtherinformation,contactDr.EdgarBlanco,DirectoroftheMITCTLEmergingMarketsResearchInitiative,at:eblanco@mit.edu,ortel:+16172533630.AcknowledgmentsTheauthorwouldliketoacknowledgethevaluablecontributionsofJimRiceandKenCottrill,bothfromtheMITCenterforTransportation&Logistics,tothisarticle.ReferencesBanga,K.andMahajanV.“TheLandsofOpportunity”.WhartonSchoolPublishing.Gingrich,J.“FiveRulesforWinningEmergingMarketsConsumers”.Strategy+Business.2006.Lapide,L.“TheFourHabitsofHighlyEffectiveSupplyChains”,SupplyChainStrategy.May2005.TheMcKinseyQuarterly,2006SpecialEdition.Formoregeneralupdatesonthisandotherprojects,subscribetotheMITCenterforTransportation&Logistics’freeelectronicnewsletter,MITSupplyChainFrontiers,athttp://ctl.mit.edu/frontiers.NEXTSTEPS
1/16/2021Why the World Isn’t Flat – Foreign Policyhttps://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/14/why-the-world-isnt-flat/1/7IFEATUREWhy the World Isn’t FlatGlobalization has bound people, countries, and markets closer than ever, renderingnational borders relics of a bygone era — or so we’re told. But a close look at the datareveals a world that’s just a fraction as integrated as the one we thought we knew. In fact,more than 90 percent of all phone calls, Web traffic, and investment is local. What’smore, even this small level of globalization could still slip away.BY PANKAJ GHEMAWAT | OCTOBER 14, 2009, 8:48 PMdeas will spread faster, leaping borders. Poor countries will have immediate accessto information that was once restricted to the industrial world and traveled onlyslowly, if at all, beyond it. Entire electorates will learn things that once only a fewbureaucrats knew. Small companies will offer services that previously only giants couldprovide. In all these ways, the communications revolution is profoundly democraticand liberating, leveling the imbalance between large and small, rich and poor.” Theglobal vision that Frances Cairncross predicted in her Death of Distance appears to beupon us. We seem to live in a world that is no longer a collection of isolated, “local”nations, effectively separated by high tariff walls, poor communications networks, andmutual suspicion. It’s a world that, if you believe the most prominent proponents ofglobalization, is increasingly wired, informed, and, well, “flat.”It’s an attractive idea. And if publishing trends are any indication, globalization is morethan just a powerful economic and political transformation; it’s a booming cottageindustry. According to the U.S. Library of Congress’s catalog, in the 1990s, about 500books were published on globalization. Between 2000 and 2004, there were more than4,000. In fact, between the mid-1990s and 2003, the rate of increase in globalization-related titles more than doubled every 18 months.Amid all this clutter, several books on the subject have managed to attract significantattention. During a recent TV interview, the first question I was asked — quite earnestly— was why I still thought the world was round. The interviewer was referring of courseto the thesis of New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman’s bestselling book TheWorld Is Flat. Friedman asserts that 10 forces — most of which enable connectivity andcollaboration at a distance — are “flattening” the Earth and leveling a playing field ofglobal competitiveness, the likes of which the world has never before seen.By using this website, you agree to our use of cookies. This use includes personalization of content and ads, and traffic analytics. Review ourPrivacy Policy for more information.
1/16/2021Why the World Isn’t Flat – Foreign Policyhttps://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/14/why-the-world-isnt-flat/2/7It sounds compelling enough. But Friedman’s assertions are simply the latest in a seriesof exaggerated visions that also include the “end of history” and the “convergence oftastes.” Some writers in this vein view globalization as a good thing — an escape fromthe ancient tribal rifts that have divided humans, or an opportunity to sell the samething to everyone on Earth. Others lament its cancerous spread, a process at the end ofwhich everyone will be eating the same fast food. Their arguments are mostlycharacterized by emotional rather than cerebral appeals, a reliance on prophecy,semiotic arousal (that is, treating everything as a sign), a focus on technology as thedriver of change, an emphasis on education that creates “new” people, and perhapsabove all, a clamor for attention. But they all have one thing in common: They’re wrong.In truth, the world is not nearly as connected as these writers would have us believe.Despite talk of a new, wired world where information, ideas, money, and people canmove around the planet faster than ever before, just a fraction of what we considerglobalization actually exists. The portrait that emerges from a hard look at the waycompanies, people, and states interact is a world that’s only beginning to realize thepotential of true global integration. And what these trend’s backers won’t tell you is thatglobalization’s future is more fragile than you know.THE 10 PERCENT PRESUMPTIONThe few cities that dominate international financial activity — Frankfurt, Hong Kong,London, New York — are at the height of modern global integration; which is to say,they are all relatively well connected with one another. But when you examine thenumbers, the picture is one of extreme connectivity at the local level, not a flat world.What do such statistics reveal? Most types of economic activity that could be conductedeither within or across borders turn out to still be quite domestically concentrated.One favorite mantra from globalization champions is how “investment knows noboundaries.” But how much of all the capital being invested around the world isconducted by companies outside of their home countries? The fact is, the total amountof the world’s capital formation that is generated from foreign direct investment (FDI)has been less than 10 percent for the last three years for which data are available (2003–05). In other words, more than 90 percent of the fixed investment around the world isstill domestic. And though merger waves can push the ratio higher, it has never reached20 percent. In a thoroughly globalized environment, one would expect this number tobe much higher — about 90 percent, by my calculation. And FDI isn’t an odd orunrepresentative example.By using this website, you agree to our use of cookies. This use includes personalization of content and ads, and traffic analytics. Review ourPrivacy Policy for more information.
1/16/2021Why the World Isn’t Flat – Foreign Policyhttps://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/14/why-the-world-isnt-flat/3/7The levels of internationalization associated with cross-border migration, telephonecalls, management research and education, private charitable giving, patenting, stockinvestment, and trade, as a fraction of gross domestic product (GDP), all stand muchcloser to 10 percent than 100 percent. The biggest exception in absolute terms — thetrade-to-GDP ratio shown at the bottom of the chart — recedes most of the way backdown toward 20 percent if you adjust for certain kinds of double-counting. So ifsomeone asked me to guess the internationalization level of some activity about which Ihad no particular information, I would guess it to be much closer to 10 percent — theaverage for the nine categories of data in the chart — than to 100 percent. I call this the“10 Percent Presumption.”More broadly, these and other data on cross-border integration suggest asemiglobalized world, in which neither the bridges nor the barriers between countriescan be ignored. From this perspective, the most astonishing aspect of various writingson globalization is the extent of exaggeration involved. In short, the levels ofinternationalization in the world today are roughly an order of magnitude lower thanthose implied by globalization proponents.A STRONG NATIONAL DEFENSEIf you buy into the more extreme views of the globalization triumphalists, you wouldexpect to see a world where national borders are irrelevant, and where citizensincreasingly view themselves as members of ever broader political entities. True,communications technologies have improved dramatically during the past 100 years.The cost of a three-minute telephone call from New York to London fell from $350 in1930 to about 40 cents in 1999, and it is now approaching zero for voice-over-Internettelephony. And the Internet itself is just one of many newer forms of connectivity thathave progressed several times faster than plain old telephone service. This pace ofimprovement has inspired excited proclamations about the pace of global integration.But it’s a huge leap to go from predicting such changes to asserting that decliningcommunication costs will obliterate the effects of distance. Although the barriers atborders have declined significantly, they haven’t disappeared.To see why, consider the Indian software industry — a favorite of Friedman and others.Friedman cites Nandan Nilekani, the CEO of the second-largest such firm, Infosys, ashis muse for the notion of a flat world. But what Nilekani has pointed out privately isthat while Indian software programmers can now serve the United States from India,access is assured, in part, by U.S. capital being invested — quite literally — in thatoutcome. In other words, the success of the Indian IT industry is not exempt fromBy using this website, you agree to our use of cookies. This use includes personalization of content and ads, and traffic analytics. Review ourPrivacy Policy for more information.
1/16/2021Why the World Isn’t Flat – Foreign Policyhttps://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/14/why-the-world-isnt-flat/4/7political and geographic constraints. The country of origin matters — even for capital,which is often considered stateless.Or consider the largest Indian software firm, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS).Friedman has written at least two columns in the New York Times on TCS’s LatinAmerican operations: “[I]n today’s world, having an Indian company led by aHungarian-Uruguayan servicing American banks with Montevidean engineersmanaged by Indian technologists who have learned to eat Uruguayan veggie is just thenew normal,” Friedman writes. Perhaps. But the real question is why the companyestablished those operations in the first place. Having worked as a strategy advisor toTCS since 2000, I can testify that reasons related to the tyranny of time zones,languages, and the need for proximity to clients’ local operations loomed large in thatdecision. This is a far cry from globalization proponents’ oft-cited world in whichgeography, language, and distance don’t matter.Trade flows certainly bear that theory out. Consider Canadian-U.S. trade, the largestbilateral relationship of its kind in the world. In 1988, before the North American FreeTrade Agreement (NAFTA) took effect, merchandise trade levels between Canadianprovinces — that is, within the country — were estimated to be 20 times as large as theirtrade with similarly sized and similarly distant U.S. states. In other words, there was abuilt-in “home bias.” Although NAFTA helped reduce this ratio of domestic tointernational trade — the home bias — to 10 to 1 by the mid-1990s, it still exceeds 5 to 1today. And these ratios are just for merchandise; for services, the ratio is still severaltimes larger. Clearly, the borders in our seemingly “borderless world” still matter tomost people.Geographical boundaries are so pervasive, they even extend to cyberspace. If there wereone realm in which borders should be rendered meaningless and the globalizationproponents should be correct in their overly optimistic models, it should be theInternet. Yet Web traffic within countries and regions has increased far faster thantraffic between them. Just as in the real world, Internet links decay with distance.People across the world may be getting more connected, but they aren’t connectingwith each other. The average South Korean Web user may be spending several hours aday online — connected to the rest of the world in theory — but he is probably chattingwith friends across town and e-mailing family across the country rather than meeting afellow surfer in Los Angeles. We’re more wired, but no more “global.”Just look at Google, which boasts of supporting more than 100 languages and, partly asa result, has recently been rated the most globalized Web site. But Google’s operation inBy using this website, you agree to our use of cookies. This use includes personalization of content and ads, and traffic analytics. Review ourPrivacy Policy for more information.
1/16/2021Why the World Isn’t Flat – Foreign Policyhttps://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/14/why-the-world-isnt-flat/5/7Russia (cofounder Sergey Brin’s native country) reaches only 28 percent of the marketthere, versus 64 percent for the Russian market leader in search services, Yandex, and53 percent for Rambler.Indeed, these two local competitors account for 91 percent of the Russian market foronline ads linked to Web searches. What has stymied Google’s expansion into theRussian market? The biggest reason is the difficulty of designing a search engine tohandle the linguistic complexities of the Russian language. In addition, these localcompetitors are more in tune with the Russian market, for example, developingpayment methods through traditional banks to compensate for the dearth of creditcards. And, though Google has doubled its reach since 2003, it’s had to set up a Moscowoffice in Russia and hire Russian software engineers, underlining the continuedimportance of physical location. Even now, borders between countries define — andconstrain — our movements more than globalization breaks them down.TURNING BACK THE CLOCKIf globalization is an inadequate term for the current state of integration, there’s anobvious rejoinder: Even if the world isn’t quite flat today, it will be tomorrow. Torespond, we have to look at trends, rather than levels of integration at one point in time.The results are telling. Along a few dimensions, integration reached its all-time highmany years ago. For example, rough calculations suggest that the number of long-terminternational migrants amounted to 3 percent of the world’s population in 1900 — thehigh-water mark of an earlier era of migration — versus 2.9 percent in 2005.Along other dimensions, it’s true that new records are being set. But this growth hashappened only relatively recently, and only after long periods of stagnation andreversal. For example, FDI stocks divided by GDP peaked before World War I and didn’treturn to that level until the 1990s. Several economists have argued that the mostremarkable development over the long term was the declining level ofinternationalization between the two World Wars. And despite the records being set, thecurrent level of trade intensity falls far short of completeness, as the Canadian-U.S.trade data suggest. In fact, when trade economists look at these figures, they areamazed not at how much trade there is, but how little.It’s also useful to examine the considerable momentum that globalization proponentsattribute to the constellation of policy changes that led many countries — particularlyChina, India, and the former Soviet Union — to engage more extensively with theinternational economy. One of the better-researched descriptions of these policyBy using this website, you agree to our use of cookies. This use includes personalization of content and ads, and traffic analytics. Review ourPrivacy Policy for more information.
1/16/2021Why the World Isn’t Flat – Foreign Policyhttps://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/14/why-the-world-isnt-flat/6/7changes and their implications is provided by economists Jeffrey Sachs and AndrewWarner:“The years between 1970 and 1995, and especially the last decade, have witnessed themost remarkable institutional harmonization and economic integration among nationsin world history. While economic integration was increasing throughout the 1970s and1980s, the extent of integration has come sharply into focus only since the collapse ofcommunism in 1989. In 1995, one dominant global economic system is emerging.”Yes, such policy openings are important. But to paint them as a sea change is inaccurateat best. Remember the 10 Percent Presumption, and that integration is only beginning.The policies that we fickle humans enact are surprisingly reversible. Thus, FrancisFukuyama’s The End of History, in which liberal democracy and technologically drivencapitalism were supposed to have triumphed over other ideologies, seems quite quainttoday. In the wake of Sept. 11, 2001, Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations looks atleast a bit more prescient. But even if you stay on the economic plane, as Sachs andWarner mostly do, you quickly see counterevidence to the supposed decisiveness ofpolicy openings. The so-called Washington Consensus around market-friendly policiesran up against the 1997 Asian currency crisis and has since frayed substantially — forexample, in the swing toward neopopulism across much of Latin America. In terms ofeconomic outcomes, the number of countries — in Latin America, coastal Africa, andthe former Soviet Union — that have dropped out of the “convergence club” (defined interms of narrowing productivity and structural gaps vis-à-vis the advancedindustrialized countries) is at least as impressive as the number of countries that havejoined the club. At a multilateral level, the suspension of the Doha round of trade talksin the summer of 2006 — prompting The Economist to run a cover titled “The Future ofGlobalization” and depicting a beached wreck — is no promising omen. In addition, therecent wave of cross-border mergers and acquisitions seems to be encountering moreprotectionism, in a broader range of countries, than did the previous wave in the late1990s.Of course, given that sentiments in these respects have shifted in the past 10 years or so,there is a fair chance that they may shift yet again in the next decade. The point is, it’snot only possible to turn back the clock on globalization-friendly policies, it’s relativelyeasy to imagine it happening. Specifically, we have to entertain the possibility that deepinternational economic integration may be inherently incompatible with nationalsovereignty — especially given the tendency of voters in many countries, includingadvanced ones, to support more protectionism, rather than less. As Jeff Immelt, CEO ofGE, put it in late 2006, “If you put globalization to a popular vote in the U.S., it wouldBy using this website, you agree to our use of cookies. This use includes personalization of content and ads, and traffic analytics. Review ourPrivacy Policy for more information.
1/16/2021Why the World Isn’t Flat – Foreign Policyhttps://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/14/why-the-world-isnt-flat/7/7VIEW COMMENTSlose.” And even if cross-border integration continues on its upward path, the road fromhere to there is unlikely to be either smooth or straight. There will be shocks and cycles,in all likelihood, and maybe even another period of stagnation or reversal that willendure for decades. It wouldn’t be unprecedented.The champions of globalization are describing a world that doesn’t exist. It’s a finestrategy to sell books and even describe a potential environment that may somedayexist. Because such episodes of mass delusion tend to be relatively short-lived evenwhen they do achieve broad currency, one might simply be tempted to wait this one outas well. But the stakes are far too high for that. Governments that buy into the flat worldare likely to pay too much attention to the “golden straitjacket” that Friedmanemphasized in his earlier book, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, which is supposed toensure that economics matters more and more and politics less and less. Buying intothis version of an integrated world — or worse, using it as a basis for policymaking — isnot only unproductive. It is dangerous.Photo Credit: Dan Kitwood/Getty ImagesTAGS: 159, ARGUMENT, DAVOS, DEFAULT, FEATURE, FREE, GLOBALIZATION, TRADEBy using this website, you agree to our use of cookies. This use includes personalization of content and ads, and traffic analytics. Review ourPrivacy Policy for more information.
WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY EXTENSION • EM041EA Primer on Exchange Rates and Exporting
2A Primer on Exchange Rates and ExportingBy Andrew J. Cassey and Pavan DhanireddyAbstractOpportunities to begin exporting or to expand export operations depend on a number of factors but one of the most important is the exchange rate. Individual business owners can do nothing to affect the exchange rate, but they can leverage their export opportunities using knowledge of exchange rate movements. This short primer, intended primarily for small business owners and owners new to exporting, will 1) describe the theoretical relationship between exchange rates and exports, 2) describe and interpret the exchange rate data, and 3) examine trends in exchange rates for the U.S. dollar going back to 1990. This combination of theory and data will reveal the reasons why exchange rates are important, and how understanding them will allow for improved international business decisions. AcknowledgementsA portion of this work was funded through a grant from the Community Economic Revitalization Board’s Export Assistance Program awarded to the Washing-ton State University Small Business Development Cen-ter and the IMPACT Center in the School of Economic Sciences. This work was also partially funded by the Agricultural Research Center Project #0540 at Wash-ington State University. The authors thank Yunfei Zhao, Rob McDaniel, Tom Marsh, Brett Rogers, Terry Chambers, Morag Stewart, and Janet Leister for their support. We also thank the Washington State Depart-ment of Commerce and the Washington State Depart-ment of Agriculture for their support. IntroductionOne of the most daunting challenges for potential exporters in Washington state is to understand how the exchange rate between American and foreign currency can affect exports. This manual identifies and discusses important features of these exchange rates to better educate small- and medium-sized business owners and owners new to the exporting business. These features include: 1) the theoretical relationship between exchange rates and exports, 2) the correct understanding of exchange rate data, and 3) exchange rate data for American and foreign export currencies since 1990.No individual firm can control the exchange rate or its fluctuations over time, so firms must make their export decisions given the current exchange rate and expectations of future exchange rates. Thus understanding how exchange rates work, and how to correctly interpret exchange rate data are key to a successful export decision. The Relationship between Exchange Rates and ExportingTwo Markets, Not Just OneWhen a business sells domestically, there is a single transaction. A good or service is exchanged for currency at an agreed upon price. But when a business sells internationally, there are two transactions. In the first transaction, a foreign buyer pays for the good or service at the agreed upon price in foreign currency. This transaction takes place within the theoretical foreign goods market. In the second transaction, the foreign currency is traded or exchanged for U.S. dollars at the agreed upon price. This second transaction takes place within the theoretical exchange rate market, and the agreed upon price is called the exchange rate. Because there are two transactions for every international sale, the complexity and uncertainty of these sales are greater than for domestic sales. The revenue received by an exporter, in particular, can be affected by changes in two markets, rather than just one.The market for goods and services is where a good or service is traded for currency, and this market exists for domestic as well as foreign sales. Consider what this market looks like from the perspective of a buyer. The buyer is located in a particular country, say Mexico. The Mexican buyer looks at the options available in a market made up of both domestic (Mexican) sellers and foreign (United States) sellers. In Figure 1, the quantity of the good being sold (in units) is shown on the horizontal axis, and the price of the quantity of good being sold is shown on the
3vertical axis. Because Figure 1 illustrates the market for goods in Mexico, the price per unit of goods is shown in Mexican pesos.Figure 1 also shows the upward sloping supply curve and the downward sloping demand curve for the Mexican goods market. The intersection of these two slopes is the equilibrium point. This point is the quantity of the good that is traded and the price per unit of the trade. In this figure, 20 units of the good are bought and sold at a price of 12.5 Mexican pesos per unit. Note that the location of the seller is unimportant, since the buyer will purchase the goods using pesos whether or not the seller is in Mexico or in the United States. Now consider the foreign exchange market (Figure 2). Suppose the Mexican buyer purchases the good or service from a U.S. seller. The Mexican pesos used in the first purchasing transaction must then be used to buy U.S. dollars in the second transaction. The horizontal axis in Figure 2 shows the amount of the good being purchased, and the vertical axis shows the price of the good being purchased. In this example, pesos are being used to purchase dollars, so the quantity or number of dollars is shown on the horizontal axis, and the price (in pesos) per dollar is shown on the vertical axis. The foreign exchange market functions the same way the market for goods and services does. There is an upward sloping supply curve of dollars with various prices (in pesos) per dollar, and there is a downward sloping demand curve of dollars with various prices (in pesos) per dollar. The intersecting point of these two slopes is the equilibrium point, and this point indicates the number of dollars traded and the price (in pesos) for each dollar. To see that the foreign exchange market functions in the same way the market for goods and services does, notice that the equilibrium point is the same in Figure 1 and Figure 2. In Figure 2 then, a total of 20 dollars is being sold at a price or rate of 12.5 pesos per dollar.Why Foreign Exchange Prices ChangeChanges in price and quantity affect market volatility but so do other changing factors, such as nationwide income levels, population sizes and preferences, costs of overall production, technology used in overall production as well as factors like droughts, floods, and other natural disasters. When one or more of these factors changes, the market responds by setting a new point of equilibrium. Any factors that change the demand for a country’s currency (other than the exchange rate itself) will shift the demand curve and create a new point of equilibrium. Conversely, any factors that change the supply of currency will shift the supply curve and create a new point of equilibrium as well. Both Figure 1 and Figure 3 show the same market for goods and services in Mexico, but the market in Figure 3 has responded to a change, (e.g., a change in preferences or an increase in buyers’ incomes), with an outward shift of the demand curve. This shift results in a new point of equilibrium in which more goods or services are bought or sold at a higher price (in pesos). Figure 3 illustrates one source of uncertainty, but outside events can change the price established by the market for goods and services, and both foreign (U.S.) and domestic (Mexican) sellers are subject to this uncertainty. Figure 4 shows the same foreign exchange market as seen in Figure 2, but the market has responded to an outward shift of the demand Figure 1. Market for goods and services in the foreign country. Twenty units of goods and services (horizontal axis) are being bought and sold at a price (vertical axis) of 12.5 pesos per unit.Figure 2. Foreign exchange market. Dollars (horizontal axis) are being bought and sold at a price (vertical axis) of 12.5 pesos per dollar.
4curve for dollars. The result of this shift is that more dollars are being bought and sold at a higher price (in pesos). Figure 4 illustrates a second source of uncertainty for the foreign (U.S.) seller, since outside events can shift the exchange rate (price per dollar), whereas domestic (Mexican) sellers do not have this uncertainty. The equilibrium value of the exchange rate changes constantly throughout a given day, which means that either the supply or demand curves (or both) shift many times throughout the day. The frequency of these shifts means that they are not caused by large or rare events like natural disasters or changes in population size or makeup. Rather, these shifts are due to current market news and speculation that precipitate a change in expectations regarding the value of currency in the future. Changes in the expectation of future exchange rates can shift the demand and supply curves suddenly and frequently, causing a change in exchange rates in the present. (International traders can avoid the risk of exchange rate fluctuations with financial instruments; however, a description of these instruments is outside the scope of this discussion.)The implication of these market movements for U.S. sellers is that revenue from foreign sales is affected by both the market for goods and services and the foreign exchange market, making the U.S. (foreign) sales revenue more volatile than the sales revenue of the Mexican (domestic) seller. However, it also means that if outside events affect the foreign exchange market without affecting the market for goods and services, a Mexican buyer may perceive the U.S. (foreign) seller’s good to be cheaper than that of the Mexican (domestic) seller. On the other hand, outside events in the foreign exchange market could make the U.S. seller’s good appear to be more expensive than that of the Mexican seller. Consider a real-world example in which a European buyer is planning to purchase 10,000 units of a good produced by an American firm or a French firm. Both the American and French firms initially charge one euro for each unit of the good. On June 8, 2011, each euro could buy $1.46 (and each dollar could buy .68 euro), but by June 16, each euro could buy only $1.41 (and each dollar could buy .71 euro). Thus between June 8 and June 16, the U.S. dollar appreciated. The American firm would have received $14,600 for the sale on June 8 but only $14,100 on June 16. In order for the American firm to maintain a profit margin, it would have to increase its price from one euro to 1.035 euros. However, this price increase makes the good from the American firm more expensive than the good from the French firm, thus making the American firm less competitive. Appreciation, Depreciation, and their Relevance for ExportsAppreciation is when each unit of a domestic currency can buy more units of a foreign currency than it could before, which means that the price of the foreign currency decreases. A domestic currency that can purchase more foreign currency over a sustained period of time is known as a strong currency. Depreciation is when each unit of domestic currency buys less of a foreign currency than it Figure 3. Market for goods and services in the foreign country with an outward shift of the demand curve. There is a new equilibrium with more units of goods and services bought and sold and an increase in price from 12.5 to 14.0 pesos per unit.Figure 4. Foreign exchange market with an outward shift of the demand curve. There is a new equilibrium with more units of dollars bought and sold and an increase in price from 12.5 to 14.0 pesos per dollar.
5could before, which means that the price of the foreign currency increases. A domestic currency that purchases less of a foreign currency over a sustained period of time is known as a weak currency. Consequently, when one currency appreciates, the other currency must depreciate. In Figure 4, the price of a U.S. dollar increased from 12.5 pesos to 14.0 pesos (one U.S. dollar could buy 12.5 pesos but now that same one dollar can buy 14.0 pesos), so the Mexican peso depreciated and the U.S. dollar appreciated. There is a common belief that a currency’s strength or weakness is tied to the strength or weakness of the economy. However, this belief does not prove true because a strong currency makes imported goods appear cheaper than competing domestic goods, and exported goods appear more expensive than the domestic goods. Thus, a strong currency is only an advantage to domestic buyers and foreign sellers and is a disadvantage to domestic sellers and foreign buyers. Conversely, a weak currency is an advantage to domestic sellers and foreign buyers because it makes domestic goods appear cheaper to foreign buyers, but it is a disadvantage to domestic buyers and foreign sellers. So as one currency appreciates the corresponding currency depreciates, since it is impossible for all currencies to be strong at the same time. Floating versus Fixed Exchange Rate SystemsIn a floating exchange rate system, the demand and supply curves set the equilibrium exchange rate, which is the going rate. However, in a fixed exchange rate system, the government mandates a set exchange rate and by buying or selling excess currency, it does not allow the market to determine the exchange rate. A government’s buying or selling of currency is known as currency intervention.The advantage of a flexible or floating exchange rate system is that market forces prevail, and so the outcome aligns with the market pressures of demand and supply. The disadvantage, as discussed earlier, is that the volatility in the exchange rate market makes international transactions riskier than domestic ones. On the other hand, the advantage of a fixed system is that there is no volatility, and international transactions are less risky. Risk is reduced because the government absorbs any shocks to the exchange rate by buying excess currency when there is a surplus and selling currency when there is a shortage. The disadvantage of a fixed exchange rate system is that it favors either exporters or importers, depending on whether the exchange rate is set above or below the free market equilibrium price.In Figure 5, the Mexican government (though it could be the U.S. government as well) has instituted a fixed exchange rate of 14 pesos per dollar. Since the equilibrium exchange rate is 12.5 pesos per dollar, this fixed rate is artificially weakening the peso and strengthening the dollar. As described in the section on appreciation and depreciation, this policy hurts domestic (Mexican) buyers and foreign (U.S.) sellers, but helps domestic (Mexican) sellers and foreign (U.S.) buyers relative to the market’s equilibrium-determined exchange rate. In other words, when a government fixes an exchange rate above the equilibrium value, it depreciates its own currency in order to facilitate exports at the expense of imports. The Mexican government uses pesos to buy dollars and must then remove those dollars from circulation in order to enforce the fixed exchange rate, which then results in a build up of U.S. currency reserves. Understanding Exchange Rate DataAn exchange rate can be reported for each corresponding currency. For example, an exchange rate of 10 pesos per dollar can also be reported as one peso per $0.10. This distinction is important because a change in the exchange rate to 14 pesos per dollar means the U.S. dollar has appreciated and the Mexican peso has depreciated. Now one peso buys .0714 of a dollar, down from .1000 of a dollar. Historically, exchange rate data have been reported as foreign currency per dollar, although there are exceptions. For instance, the British pound and the euro are frequently (though not always) reported as dollars per pound and dollars per euro, respectively. Two types of exchange rates are the spot rate and the forward rate. The spot rate is the current or Figure 5. The exchange rate is fixed at 14 pesos per dollar, creating a surplus of 24 – 16 = 8 dollars. To enforce the fixed exchange rate, the government must purchase the surplus $8.00, which is then stored in reserves.
6going exchange rate, while the forward rate is the exchange rate a market will use at some future date. Buyers and sellers are agreeing on a price now for a currency transaction that will take place in the future. The forward exchange rate market is similar to the futures market in commodities and is one way those engaged in international trade can avoid the risk of exchange rate volatility. Although spot rates are freely reported in the Wall Street Journal and online, forward rates must be obtained from a financial services company, since only a few rates are reported in the Wall Street Journal. An example of a forward exchange rate transaction (using the Japanese yen) is to say that on June 25, 2011, the spot exchange rate was 80.40 yen per one U.S. dollar, which means that one dollar spent on this date will buy 80.40 yen. The 30-day forward exchange rate was 78.56, meaning that one dollar spent on June 25 would buy 78.56 yen on July 25. That this forward rate is lower indicates that the market believes the dollar will depreciate relative to the yen. On July 25, the spot exchange rate may be above or below 78.56 yen. Thus it is a gamble to use forward exchange rates, but the benefit of using them is the certainty it provides in regard to future rates. Another type of exchange rate data identifies the difference between nominal and real exchange rates. Real exchange rates account for inflation by adjusting the exchange rate using a cost-of-living price index, whereas the nominal exchange rate does not adjust for inflation. (At times, the real exchange rate is calculated using the domestic and foreign prices of a particular good, instead of using a general cost-of-living price index.) Accounting for inflation can be important because the nominal exchange rate changes if a surplus of currency creates inflation, whereas the terms of trade—which are better measured by the real exchange rate—do not change. In practice, however, real exchange rates can only be known afterwards, once inflation data are known, making it impossible to obtain both spot and real exchange rates at the same time. For example, consider the spot exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen. In December 2010, one dollar purchased 89.90 yen, but due to differences in inflation and the cost of living, the real exchange rate was 100.00 yen. The real exchange rate is higher because the U.S. price index grew from 100 in 2005 to 110 in 2010 (indicating about a 2% annual inflation rate), whereas the Japanese price index shrank from 100 in 2005 to 98.86 in 2010 (indicating a slight deflation). Perhaps the best way to think about this is that the nominal exchange rate has depreciated relative to the real exchange rate because U.S. inflation has decreased the number of yen one U.S. dollar can buy. Another way to look at it is to see that although one dollar buys 89.90 yen, one dollar’s worth of U.S. goods is worth 98.86 yen.A currency index, also called an effective exchange rate, is a measure of a particular country’s exchange rate relative to a list of other countries. This index is used to determine the relative strength or weakness of one currency compared to all other currencies, instead of comparing it to just one other currency. Unlike a standard exchange rate, an effective exchange rate is relative to a benchmark value of 100. A trade-weighted currency index is modified using the value of trade with each trading partner. The exchange rate for a country that is a large trade partner is weighted more heavily than the exchange rate with a country that is a small trade partner. Effective exchange rates are useful as a broad measure of the dollar’s strength but are not helpful in terms of financial transactions or international purchases with a customer in a particular country. The best places to obtain effective exchange rate data are from the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank and the Bank of International Settlements, http://www.bis.org/statistics/eer/index.htm. So, if the effective exchange rate for the U.S. dollar was set at 100 in January of 2005, and the 2011 effective exchange rate is 91.19, this indicates a general depreciation of the U.S. dollar. Further, if the effective exchange rate is 95 in 2013, this will indicate that the U.S. dollar has appreciated relative to 2011 but has depreciated when compared to 2005.Trends in Exchange RatesExchange rate data are readily available on the web. The data in the following figures have been compiled by the authors using information freely available online at http://www.oanda.com. Canada is currently the biggest U.S. trading partner. (The nominal and real exchange rates between the U.S. and Canada are displayed in Figure 6.) Beginning in the early 1990s, the U.S. dollar appreciated against the Canadian dollar, which means that one U.S. dollar could buy more Canadian dollars in 2000 than it could in 1990. But after 2002, the U.S. dollar has been slowly depreciating, dropping to its lowest point in 2008, then, after a sharp appreciation in 2009, again depreciating in 2010. There are two important features to note in Figure 6. First, the nominal and real exchange rates are similar, in particular after 2002. They are similar because inflation has been low since 1990 and exceptionally low since 2002. Second, though the data exhibit frequent, although minor fluctuations, there are, nonetheless, unambiguous trends. The U.S. dollar
7appreciated and was strong throughout the 1990s, but recently it has depreciated, meaning U.S. goods and services are now somewhat cheaper in Canada than they were previously. Figure 7 shows the exchange rate between the Mexican peso and the U.S. dollar (since Mexico revalued its currency in 1993, data is not plotted prior to this year.)1 Unlike Canada, Mexico shows a big difference in its nominal and real exchange rates because it experienced high inflation in the 1990s. If only the nominal exchange rate is considered, then the U.S. dollar appears to have appreciated in the same period. However, the real exchange rate tells another story. This rate shows that the U.S. dollar actually depreciated against the inflation-adjusted 1 Currency revaluation occurs when a country eliminates zeros. For example, a 1000 peso note becomes a one peso note.peso. (Note that, as with Canada, there was a sharp jump in appreciation in 2009.) Japan is one of Washington state’s biggest trading partners, and although the U.S. dollar has fluctuated, the overall trend with the nominal exchange rate has been a depreciation of the U.S. dollar relative to the Japanese yen. The real exchange rate also has had periods of fluctuation, but the overall trend has been roughly constant (Figure 8). (Unlike the Mexican peso and Canadian dollar, the Japanese yen did not experience a jump in appreciation in 2009.) Figure 9 shows the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the Chinese yuan. Compared to the other exchange rates, the rate between the U.S. and China is not volatile because China fixes its nominal exchange rate with the United States. Between 1996 and 2005, the nominal exchange rate between China and the U.S. was constant, and the real exchange rate appreciated due to somewhat higher inflation in China. In 2005, the Chinese government announced that it would let the exchange rate float to some degree. Figure 9 shows that in allowing the exchange rate to float, the U.S. dollar depreciated, which indicates that the Chinese were fixing the exchange rate above the equilibrium exchange rate. To accomplish this, the Chinese government had to buy large reserves of U.S. dollars. The Chinese government fixed the exchange rate again from 2008 to 2010 but at a lower rate than before, although this new fixed exchange rate was still above the equilibrium rate. Recently, the Chinese government has allowed the dollar to depreciate once again, but they have used currency intervention to ensure that depreciation of the dollar does not move too quickly. Figure 6. Real and nominal exchange rate between the Canadian dollar and the U.S. dollar. Source: Author’s compilation using data located at http://www.oanda.com.Figure 7. Real and nominal exchange rate between the Mexican peso and the U.S. dollar. Source: Author’s compilation using data located at http://www.oanda.com.Figure 8. Real and nominal exchange rate between the Japanese yen and the U.S. dollar. Source: Author’s compilation using data located at http://www.oanda.com.
8Figure 10 shows the trade-weighted currency index for the U.S. dollar. This index was arbitrarily constructed so that the exchange rate would be 100 in 2005. The purpose of doing this was to determine the trend in the data over time relative to the 2005 benchmark. The trade-weighted index contains a basket of world currencies, including currencies from Canada, Mexico, Japan, and China, and it also prominently features the euro and the British pound. Figure 10 confirms the trends we have previously discussed, namely, the depreciation of the U.S. dollar since 2002 and the 2009 jump in appreciation. The theory, data, and trends presented in this primer offer important lessons for Washington state business owners. The main lesson, seen in almost all the figures but best seen in Figure 10, is that the U.S. dollar has been weakening since 2002. This depreciation of the dollar is an advantage to U.S. firms that sell abroad because it makes U.S. goods somewhat cheaper in foreign markets. Another lesson is that as long as China keeps its currency at a fixed exchange rate, there will be little risk of exchange rate volatility for either buyers or sellers. However, China’s fixed exchange rate also means that U.S. exporters are not getting the benefit of depreciation in China that they get in other countries. The final lesson is that better export decisions, in particular, decisions regarding competitive and profitable pricing in overseas markets can be achieved by understanding how the movement of exchange rates affect prices in domestic and foreign markets.Figure 9. Real and nominal exchange rate between the Chinese yuan and the U.S. dollar. Source: Author’s compilation using data located at http://www.oanda.com.Figure 10. Trade-weighted currency index centered so that 2005 = 100. Source: Author’s compilation using data from the U.S Federal Reserve.
By Andrew J. Cassey and Pavan Dhanireddy, Washington State University School of Economic Sciences.Copyright 2011 Washington State University WSU Extension bulletins contain material written and produced for public distribution. Alternate formats of our educational materials are available upon request for persons with disabilities. Please contact Washington State University Extension for more information.You may order copies of this and other publications from WSU Extension at 1-800-723-1763 or http://pubs.wsu.edu.Issued by Washington State University Extension and the U.S. Department of Agriculture in furtherance of the Acts of May 8 and June 30, 1914. Extension programs and policies are consistent with federal and state laws and regulations on nondiscrimination regarding race, sex, religion, age, color, creed, and national or ethnic origin; physical, mental, or sensory disability; marital status or sexual orientation; and status as a Vietnam-era or disabled veteran. Evidence of noncompliance may be reported through your local WSU Extension office. Trade names have been used to simplify information; no endorsement is intended. Published October 2011. EM041E
12/27/2020Developing winning products for emerging marketshttps://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/developing-winning-products-for-emerging-markets1/10OperationsAlarge automaker designed, developed, and—with appropriate fanfare—launched acommercial truck in India’s burgeoning and highly competitive market. The vehiclewas engineered to let owners in a range of emerging markets run the trucks longer andfaster, and at a relatively low operating cost. Higher asset utilization, company leadersbelieved, would improve pro ts for truck owners and, ultimately, the automaker.DOWNLOADS Article (PDF 244KB)By Sauri Gudlavalleti, Shivanshu Gupta, and Ananth Narayanan
12/27/2020Developing winning products for emerging marketshttps://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/developing-winning-products-for-emerging-markets2/10The truck was a disappointment. The company hadn’t adequately accounted for India’spoor roads and infrastructure, which often prevent vehicles from maintaining the moste cient operating speeds. Even though the truck’s price was competitive against localo erings—and half that of a comparable vehicle in developed markets—in the buyers’ eyesthe potentially higher utilization wasn’t worth the expense.Think this was a ham- sted multinational dabbling in a market it didn’t fully understand?Think again: the automaker was based in India. To be sure, multinationals tend to su ersuch setbacks more often than local players do, but this company’s example underscoresthe di culty of understanding customer needs in fast-changing emerging markets.Indeed, around the same time, another domestic competitor su ered a similar fate. Thatcompany’s commercial vehicle, o ered at an even lower price, was also tailored for India; itfeatured a lower-capacity, low-cost engine well-suited to run e ciently on the country’sgrid-locked roads. Yet it too proved a letdown. The cause: an unfairly earned reputation forunreliability that the company ultimately attributed to owner–operators who, to maximizepro ts, overloaded the trucks far beyond recommended weight limits. Within a couple ofyears, the overloaded engines began to malfunction, customers became angry, and thevehicle’s sales plummeted.Such cases underscore the challenges of designing, developing, and manufacturingproducts for fast-changing emerging markets—environments where customers are bothextremely price conscious and demanding. Against this backdrop, a growing number ofcompanies nd that they must reexamine their traditional approaches to productdevelopment and tailor them to these realities. We call this process “design to value.” Insome cases, designing to value means applying traditional tools in new ways, in othersadopting a new mind-set about what customers want and how to deliver it.
12/27/2020Developing winning products for emerging marketshttps://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/developing-winning-products-for-emerging-markets3/10It’s still early days in this space, and no organization has yet mastered the challenges. Buta look at the practices that leading product developers use o ers at least three lessons forcompanies wrestling with the extremes of competition in emerging markets. The urgencyto adapt will only increase as consumption in these markets contributes a growing share ofglobal economic growth in the decade ahead.1. Shake up your thinkingThe combination of rapid change and heightened competition in emerging markets puts apremium on useful customer insights, even as they become harder to get. Indeed, poorinfrastructure, vast distances, and fast-changing customer segments make traditional fact-gathering approaches (such as ethnographic research or even focus groups) expensiveand time-consuming. Therefore, top companies don’t pass up any opportunity, howevermodest, to sharpen their understanding of customer needs.Collision workshops—which might include customers but primarily convene suppliers,marketers, product engineers, and other company representatives— can help. They o er alow-tech way of quickly generating and discussing customer insights and a forum toidentify hypotheses that companies can later test more traditionally. To some extent, thesemeetings represent a cheaper and more exible way of generating the kinds of insightsthat R&D pioneers such as Bell Labs and IBM’s Watson Research Group achieved throughformal, multidisciplinary R&D labs. As with these venerable examples, an important goal ofcollision workshops is to challenge ingrained habits of thought by pulling togetherrepresentatives from functional groups that normally don’t interact.The resulting insights can be quite useful. An automotive-parts manufacturer in a fast-growing Asian market used a collision workshop to identify a new niche in its wheelbusiness. During a discussion about products for passenger vehicles, a marketer[1][2]
12/27/2020Developing winning products for emerging marketshttps://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/developing-winning-products-for-emerging-markets4/10mentioned that the company’s wheels were heavy—an observation he’d heard from acustomer. This comment, made in passing, intrigued the engineers in the room, who wenton to sketch out a counterintuitive proposal that the company ultimately re ned andadopted: using a slightly higher grade of steel to make wheels lighter and more fuele cient. Even though the new steel was more expensive, the company lowered its totalcosts because the wheels now required less steel than they had before.A large telecommunications and data-services provider used a collision workshop todiscuss how B2B customers in smaller, tier-two and -three cities di ered from those in thelargest urban areas. The “aha moment” came when marketing and pricing experts teamedup with product engineers to ask whether the company might o er price discounts tosome customers in smaller cities in exchange for slightly lower network uptime than thenear-100 percent guaranteed to commercial customers in major metropolitan areas. Thecompany ultimately found it could lower its price for some customers in tier-two cities,making its o er highly competitive there, while slashing the cost to serve by a factor of fourthrough the use of a di erent network architecture and a simpler, redesigned version of itsstandard network-switching equipment.Another way companies shake up their thinking is to look beyond traditional competitorsfor design ideas. A low-cost appliance maker learned of a more high-tech approach forcoating its fans by studying painting techniques developed in the automotive industry. Thefan maker’s executives had always resisted technological solutions, preferring tosubstitute labor for capital because of low workforce costs. But after studying theautomakers’ approach, which kept the thickness of each coat of paint to speci ed levels,the executives changed their minds. Ultimately, a 4 percent savings in paint costs morethan o set the expense of new equipment.
12/27/2020Developing winning products for emerging marketshttps://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/developing-winning-products-for-emerging-markets5/10Similarly, a global farm-equipment manufacturer looked to an adjacent vehicle category inwhich it didn’t compete to create a simpler, cheaper design for the claw mechanism in anew low-cost rice-transplanting machine. By applying this thinking to other products, thecompany also identi ed comparable improvements in a di erent low cost product line.2. Start from scratchBy now, most companies recognize that trying to interest discerning emerging-marketconsumers in stripped-down, low-cost versions of the products they sell globally is arecipe for letdown. Yet many companies still aren’t fully aware of how far they must go todi erentiate their products for these customers. Top companies, by contrast, are highlydisciplined, even relentless, about setting priorities and putting aside existingassumptions. Leaders start by identifying the most important feature or two and focusingheavily on them (exhibit). This approach is quite di erent from the one that manycompanies tend to have: regarding all features as equally valuable and preferring morerather than fewer of them—an attitude deeply ingrained in some engineering cultures.
12/27/2020Developing winning products for emerging marketshttps://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/developing-winning-products-for-emerging-markets6/10The farm-equipment maker started with a feature that its analysis showed mattered mostto small-scale farmers: the durability of tires. Farming in one region required considerableback-and-forth driving in mixed terrain (tar roads and soil). By redesigning tires toExhibitIdentifying and prioritizing the right features for emergingmarkets requires discipline.
12/27/2020Developing winning products for emerging marketshttps://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/developing-winning-products-for-emerging-markets7/10maximize their useful life, the company made its vehicle far more appealing to localcustomers. This company’s crucial willingness to challenge its assumptions ultimately ledto a broader set of improvements.By contrast, companies that fail to reexamine the assumptions inherent in their productdesigns risk making ill-informed decisions. A global maker of electrical products learnedthis the hard way when it introduced a minicircuit-breaker system to o er customers inIndia better protection from the country’s frequent power uctuations and brownouts. Theproduct, adapted from a comparable developed-world model, was technically sound andarguably superior to the alternatives. Yet sales su ered as customers turned to productsfrom competitors o ering an older—and cheaper—“use and throw” fuse technology. Notuntil the company started over with a new design incorporating the older technology didthe product became competitive.A handful of leading companies extend this thinking further still, approaching their productportfolios with a “zero-based design” mentality. The bene ts can be profound. A globalconsumer-products company, for example, was losing share in an important Asian marketto a domestic competitor o ering a lower price for a common personal-care product.Instead of responding with a marketing push or a price cut, the consumer-goods makerran a head-to-head comparison of the two products—including a sophisticated analysis ofchemical ingredients. This investigation showed that the low-cost company, using aformulation that was half as costly as the global player’s, was achieving the same levels ofe cacy. What’s more, the rival’s pump bottle maximized margins by delivering 10 percentmore “product per pump.” After receiving this wake-up call, the global companyredesigned its product from the ground up, ultimately changing the formulation,packaging, and even design of its pump bottle. The rejuvenated product, vastly cheaper toproduce and no less e ective than its predecessor, generated a 40 percent marginimprovement.[3]
12/27/2020Developing winning products for emerging marketshttps://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/developing-winning-products-for-emerging-markets8/10Similarly, the telecommunications and data-services provider recognized that its mobile-phone towers were overdesigned compared with those of its competitors. By starting overfrom scratch, the company lowered its cost to build each tower by almost 30 percent,while still meeting or exceeding local safety regulations.3. Design for manufacturabilityA nal way top product makers separate themselves from the competition is to go onchallenging their assumptions well into the manufacturing process. Surprisingly, perhaps,though most global companies have manufactured products in emerging markets foryears, they typically don’t go as far as they could to design them with emerging-marketcustomers and workers in mind. By contrast, clever product makers look for easyopportunities to tweak their products and processes further and thereby lower their capitalcosts. To be sure, this is good practice anyplace companies operate, but an especiallyimportant one in emerging markets given the erce levels of competition there.For example, a large producer of engines and industrial equipment recognized that bymaking straightforward design changes to one of its drive-shaft assemblies, it couldreduce the complexity of the machines needed to build them. Just allowing for moregenerous radii and bends in a few key spots would make it possible to produce thecomponents with hot forging hammers, a cheaper technology than the high-speed cold-forging machines the company used at home. The changes helped reduce costs formaterials by 10 percent, in part by enabling the company to source more goods andequipment from local suppliers.The farm-equipment maker lowered its costs in a similar fashion by identifying placeswhere its frontline workers could replace expensive fasteners with cheaper welds duringproduct assembly. This reduced not only the company’s manufacturing costs but also the
12/27/2020Developing winning products for emerging marketshttps://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/developing-winning-products-for-emerging-markets9/101. For more, see Yuval Atsmon, Peter Child, Richard Dobbs, and Laxman Narasimhan, “Winning the$30 trillion decathlon: Going for gold in emerging markets,” McKinsey Quarterly, 2012 Number 4.2. See Bernard T. Ferrari and Jessica Goethals, “Using rivalry to spur innovation,” May 2010.3. The farm-equipment manufacturer’s willingness to challenge its assumptions didn’t stop withproduct design and development. The company also used the customer insights it gathered during itsproduct-redesign e orts to inform changes to its business model—for example, by adding a “lease forthe season” option that boosted revenues signi cantly.ABOUT THE AUTHOR(S)Sauri Gudlavalleti is a consultant in McKinsey’s Delhi o ce, Shivanshu Guptais a principal in the Bangalore o ce, and Ananth Narayanan is a principal in theChennai o ce.The authors wish to thank Gauranga De, Dave Fedewa, and Seungheon Song fortheir contributions to the development of this article.cost of maintenance for farmers, who otherwise had to replace the fasteners as they fello .Traditional approaches to product development are coming under strain as emergingmarkets start to dominate the global economy. Companies that learn to shake up theirthinking and e ectively challenge the assumptions about how they design, develop, andmanufacture products are more likely to master the extremes of this new competitivelandscape.
12/27/2020Developing winning products for emerging marketshttps://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/developing-winning-products-for-emerging-markets10/10Talk to us
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